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The impact of economic crisis on civic attitudes: the moderating role of 
expected social mobility.  






































































In times of crisis, the deterioration of living standards may also have direct 
consequences on civic culture of people and become dangerous for the health of 
democracy. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which the recent 
economic crisis directly influences the civic attitudes in some European democracies 
focusing on two questions: how much does crisis exposure affect democratic legitimacy 
attitudes? And what is the role played by expected social mobility on this effect?  
Design/methodology/approach  
Hypotheses are tested using data collected in the Western European countries included 
in the Life in Transition Survey II (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and UK). To 
analyse the civic consequences of crisis exposure and to evaluate the moderating role of 
expected social mobility, multivariate regressions are conducted. The statistical analysis 
is performed using the Stata software. 
Findings 
The findings show that economic crisis exposure significantly affects civic attitudes. 
The results confirm that higher crisis exposure is associated with lower civic attitudes. 
Additionally, the present research rules out the possibility that crisis exposure affects 
attitudes in a specific way, depending on the expected mobility valence. 
Social implications  































































To evaluate the moderating factors of the civic consequences of economic crises is 
important for both academic research and policymakers. Analysing these mechanisms 
may lead to understand under which conditions it is possible to limit deterioration 
processes in democratic fabric of a society. 
Originality/value 
This paper sheds light on the importance of analysing the negative civic effect of 
economic crisis and on the critical role that the fear of social downgrading plays in 
determining this effect.  
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The impact of the Great recession on the Western world since September 2008 has 
affected (and it is still affecting) the lives of millions of people, exacerbating problems 
of social exclusion and phenomena such as unemployment, poverty and inequality 
(OECD, 2013), with relevant consequences detected at the individual level.  
In times of crisis, the deterioration of living standards spreads in a growing part of the 
population together with pessimism and discouragement for a difficult future. In 
particular, in the last years, many research studies have pointed out its individual 
consequences and its negative impact on people’s well-being: for example, poor self-
rated health (Zavras et al., 2012), unhappiness (Gudmundsdottir, 2013), anger and 
depression (Ragnarsdòttir et al., 2013), as well as anxiety (Gili et al., 2012). However, 
in addition to the psychological consequences, evaluating also whether and how 
different civic attitudes (e.g., social trust, tolerance) are influenced by the recent 
economic crisis has yet received little attention. Moreover, the relatively scarce 
empirical evidence is unjustified, considering that previous literature pointed out that 
the economic deprivation may lead important anti-democratic consequences on public 
opinion, in terms of political attitudes and participation (e.g., Bermeo, 2003; 
Rothermund, 1996). In fact, in times of crisis, the diffusion of negative orientations can 
be determinant to undermine the order and the social stability of some countries, in 
which the economic systems are already highly stressed by the crisis since 2008. In 































































particular, previous research points out that a crisis is particularly conducive to 
frustration if it occurs suddenly after a prolonged period of stable or increasing 
prosperity, with high expectations internalized by people about their economic future 
(Davies, 1962). For these reasons, this study aims to evaluate the civic impact of recent 
crisis in the context of affluent Western Europe, where a prolonged period of economic 
growth preceded the economic crisis.  
Additionally, to date, there are no studies that provide empirical evidence on potential 
moderators of the civic impact of the crisis. In this specific competitive pressure 
context, in which people experience a generalized and objective economic deterioration, 
to perceive future as an opportunity rather than a threat may become crucial; 
furthermore, the social positioning may reflect even more prospects and hopes for future 
societal attainment. Consequently, in this study it is argued that more attention than is 
usually given should be paid to the role of the expected social mobility to account for 
the strength of attitudinal consequences of the crisis exposure. The rationale for this 
prediction is mainly based on relative deprivation theory, emphasizing the role of 
subjective comparison processes in distress during an economic collapse: competition 
feeling may generate social hostility toward other people, mostly when the perspective 
of enhancing the own future social position (upward mobility) is not present.  
The present study aims to address these gaps in the empirical literature by (1) exploring 
the individual differences in the civic attitudes due to crisis exposure in affluent Europe 































































(within all the five Western European countries surveyed by LiTS II: France, Germany, 
Italy, Sweden and UK), and (2) examining whether these attitudinal differences are 
moderated by relative mobility (i.e., whether the civic impact of crisis does vary 
significantly in relation to different perspectives of mobility). Analysing this mechanism 
may lead to understand under which conditions it is possible to limit deterioration 
processes in social and civil fabric.  
This article is structured as follows. In the first section, a brief literature review on civic 
impact of economic shocks, with an emphasis on potential moderating role of relative 
mobility, is provided. Database, variables and empirical model are described in the 
method section. The next section reports the results of the empirical tests. The final 
section concludes with a summary of empirical findings and discusses their 
implications, briefly exploring possible future research perspectives. 
 
Economic change and civic culture in times of crisis 
The importance of the connection between economic growth and social and democratic 
progress is not a new theme in social research. Many studies point out that economic 
growth, in terms of GDP, has positive consequences that could go beyond the economic 
and material well-being; according to this view, its effects would not be limited to 
improving the living standards of a large part of population, but it would also have a 
positive effect on democratic and civic attitudes. A rapid and large economic growth, 































































that not only involves a minority of citizens, represents a way to reverse the 
advancement of the deterioration processes in social and civil fabric of a country 
(Friedman, 2005). 
Many studies have confirmed this view. The assumed positive relationship between 
economic condition and civism can be traced back to the well-known debates about 
economic development as a prerequisite of a participant and democratic society (Lipset, 
1959; Smith, 1972). Specifically, in order to explain the beginning of the 
democratization process, the classical thesis of modernization (Lipset, 1960) argues that 
democracy and good citizenship are favoured by the economic development, so much 
so that it is argued that dictatorships have more difficulties to politically survive when 
economic growth is high (Dahl, 1971: 78). 
Positive civic consequences of economic growth occurring since the latter often ‘fosters 
greater opportunity, tolerance of diversity, social mobility, commitment to fairness, and 
dedication to democracy’ (Friedman, 2005: 4). Not surprisingly, when economic well-
being and existential security increase in societies, daily life experiences of individuals 
change, bringing them to give greater weight to goals that were previously given low 
priority, such as freedom of expression or social tolerance (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). 
During a growth phase, the creation of new jobs reduces competition in the labour 
market and people’s attitudes tend to be more tolerant (Kehrberg, 2007); at the same 































































time, many studies also find that GDP per capita is positively associated with social 
trust (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Delhey and Newton, 2005).  
As well as virtuous, the circle can be vicious. Previous research stresses the importance 
of investigating whether and how intense economic events, as crises and recessions, 
may have an impact on public opinion. In reference to the Great Depression of the early 
1930s, it has been argued that macroeconomic shocks are ‘beliefs-twisting events’ 
(Cogley and Sargent, 2008), and that economic crises have persistent effects on 
attitudes causing a pessimistic orientation for a long time (Friedman and Schwartz, 
1963), with slightly stronger effects for people who suffered more during periods of 
hardship.  
Such as economic growth promotes optimism, greater openness, tolerance and 
democracy, at the same time economic deterioration can adversely reshape the civic 
culture of a community. According to this view, several studies have investigated the 
civic and democratic impact of sudden and unexpected material deteriorations, such as 
those resulting from an economic crisis. It is reported that a popular reaction to an 
economic crisis can become dramatic and significant (Lindvall, 2013). In times of crisis, 
people could turn their backs to democracy (Bermeo, 2003) and the economic distress 
generated by crises may produce ‘combustible potential’ (Achen and Bartels, 2005: 34) 
capable of triggering sociopolitical change. Several studies investigate political 
attitudes, confirming that these macroeconomic events may affect trust in political 































































institutions and incumbent government (McAllister, 1999; Mishler and Rose, 2001; 
Ross and Escobar-Lemmon, 2009), generating anti-democratic consequences (Cordova 
and Seligson, 2009; Graham and Sukhtankar, 2004; Armingeon and Guthmann, 2014). 
In this regard, it is also argued that the rise of the totalitarian regimes antecedents to 
World War II are connected directly to the legitimacy crisis of capitalism, triggered by 
the global economic depression of 1929 (Rothermund, 1996). 
At the same time, beyond the potential decline of political legitimacy, democratic risks 
induced by economic crises may also concern the civic culture in general (Friedman, 
2005). It is stressed that the loss of social capital - in terms of social cohesion and 
community spirit - is closely linked to the worsening economic situation. For example, 
Besser et al. (2008), using longitudinal data on nearly 100 small towns, demonstrate 
that even small economic shocks are harmful to the residents’ quality of life and social 
capital. At the same time, another study shows how during the recent economic crisis 
the bridging social networks (e.g., neighbours, co-workers) may erode, while the 
bonding ones (e.g. family and close friends) may become even stronger (Iglic, 2014). 
The erosion of generalized trust coincides with stronger trust in familial network, which 
offers social support against uncertainty and distress (Iglic, 2014). This result confirms 
the importance of material security for the development of bridging social capital. After 
all, communities and nations with better social capital and trust respond to crises and 
transitions more happily and effectively (Helliwell et al., 2014).  































































While material well-being enables a positive view of the world where socialising with 
others creates life opportunities, in times of economic recession socialising is not seen 
as providing new opportunities (Knack and Zak, 2002; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). In 
particular, the negative attitudes typically increase when the economy contracts and 
unemployment expands (Fetzer, 2000; Kehrberg, 2007); in times of recession, higher 
perceived competition is associated with increased hostility towards immigrants 
(Zolberg, 1991), leading to the rise of the social conflict and to the crumbling of the 
solidarity (Iglic, 2014).  
In sum, the literature review set forth here indicates that most of the previous studies 
suggest potential democratic risks due to the economic shocks, investigating more 
frequently political attitudes than civic ones. Additionally, most of those studies focus 
on single-country case and on South American and Asian countries, who experienced 
significant economic recessions in less recent years (e.g. Remmer, 1991; Davis and 
Langley, 1995; Hayo, 2005; Turner and Carballo, 2005). However, the study of political 
consequences of the recent crisis is becoming increasingly important also in the 
established Western democracies (e.g., Armingeon and Guthmann, 2014; Teixeira et al., 
2014; Pappas, 2014; see also Bermeo and Bartels, 2014). The present study attempt to 
address this gap of knowledge by focusing on civic attitudes, and by investigating the 
impact of the crisis in a sample composed by affluent Western European countries. 
Specifically, from the findings of reviewed studies, it can be hypothesized that the 































































recent crisis exposure significantly affects the civic attitudes, in addition to the main 
sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics; in particular, those who 
experience higher crisis exposure are more likely to report anticivic attitudes (Hp1). 
The rationale for this hyphothesis is that the material worsening may increase the sense 
of frustration and dissatisfaction, producing a disruption in social norms and values that 
are central to social cohesion. As stressed later in the methods section, this general 
hypothesis is particularly appropriate for the specific context of affluent European 
countries, who have experienced both relatively high levels of democratic legitimacy 
and relatively high levels of well-being, before the onset of the recent recession. 
 
The moderating role of expected mobility  
To date, little is known about the civic effects of the recent economic crisis, but the 
mechanisms through which crises may more specifically influence the civic attitudes 
remain even more unexplored. This study hypothesizes that the way in which 
individuals evaluate their future social trajectory, compared to others, may be the crucial 
mechanism underlying a potential civic ‘recession’.  
In fact, with reference to expected social mobility, there are at least two potential ways 
to react to crisis exposure. On the one hand, though a person does experience 
objectively downward material change, he may view it as a temporary situation because 
of private knowledge about skills and plans that will improve his situation in the future. 































































At the same time, he may perceive his material worsening as a common condition in 
times of crisis, to the point of not evaluate his social positioning as decreasing, but 
stable or even increasing. In those cases, regardless of the current position, upward 
expected mobility and the perception of abundant opportunities lessen frustration and 
the feelings of deprivation and injustice (Wegener, 1991).  
On the other hand, the emergence of a generalized feeling of economic insecurity may 
become fear of social downgrading. A sudden recession may lead individuals to 
evaluate that the crisis has harmed them more than other members of the society. 
Consequently, crisis exposure could lead to anticivism, mainly when it is accompanied 
by perception of social downgrading, which facilitate the spread of generalized social 
anger mixed to anxiety. This framework of competitive pressure could be rooted in a 
perspective of downward expected mobility and in a consequent perception of unfair 
disadvantage, compared to others in society.  
This argument is supported by more general sociological approaches to ‘relative 
deprivation’, which claim that the subjective reality of individuals is more significant to 
them than their objective reality (Runciman, 1966). Moreover, in times of crisis, in 
presence of a generalized objective downgrading of material conditions, subjective 
comparisons may become even more significant (Ragnarsdòttir et al., 2013). More 
specifically, how people perceive their situations in comparison to salient reference 































































points may create feelings of relative deprivation (Crosby, 1976; Smith et al., 2011), 
influencing the effects of objective economic hardship on attitudes.  
Additionally, literature also stresses the significant role of valence of social mobility 
(upward vs. downward) in terms of legitimacy toward the system. For example, 
building on the relative deprivation theory, Krahn and Harrison (1992) find that people 
who perceive a social downgrading during a recession indicate more support for 
government redistribution, triggering grievance toward the social order. At the same 
time, people who experience upward mobility are less likely to justify anticivic 
behaviour, as tax evasion (Daude and Melguizo, 2012), and tend to legitimize the 
system that will allow them to move ahead (Scalon and Cano, 2008). It was also shown 
that the experience and expectation of upward mobility may contribute to the social and 
political stability (Zhiming, 2013) developing generalized political trust. 
Consequently, expected social mobility may then reflect processes that explain its 
influence on the issue of how crisis exposure comes to be translated into civic attitudes. 
The expected mobility may modify the civic effects of crisis exposure, acting on some 
of the harmful psychosocial consequences of being exposed to competitive pressure 
situations, as the sense of unfairness or the anger toward other people. For individuals 
who are more heavily exposed to the crisis, but predict upward mobility, a better 
perspective for the future may help to cope with the stress and fear of having lower 































































social status. At the same time, individuals who failed to improve their lot may be 
civically disengaged when they expect also to experience downward relative mobility.  
Applying these insights to the study of civic consequences of crisis, it is hypothesized 
that expected mobility significantly interacts with crisis exposure to influence civic 
attitudes, and that the effect of crisis exposure on civic attitudes critically depends on 
the expected mobility. In particular, the perception of upward mobility is likely to have 
a compensatory effect, significantly neutralizing the negative civic impact generated by 
crisis exposure (Hp2). 
 
Methods 
As previously seen, many studies investigated how economic and material conditions 
may influence beliefs and attitudes. However, this rapidly expanding empirical literature 
has so far treated the economic status mostly from a static perspective and failed to 
consider the effects of dynamic changes in one’s status, either realized or anticipated. In 
fact, changes in economic conditions might be more relevant than absolute levels of 
economic status with regard to understanding of civic attitudes. This dynamic 
formulation is particularly useful in times of economic crisis, when severe shocks can 
suddenly affect personal as well as national economic conditions. Following this logic, 
a marginal pre-crisis social position could remain constant without changing civic 































































attitudes, and it is only if sudden changes in economic conditions occur that attitudes 
change (Billiet et al., 2014).  
A strict test of this dynamic argument would ideally require analysing longitudinal 
survey data during the crisis. Unfortunately, such data sources are unavailable at 
present. This study adopts a different approach, confining itself to the analysis of data 
from a single time point (namely the 2010 round of the LiTS) and using retrospective 
and perspective measurements that record individual changes in socioeconomic 
conditions. Thereby, the approach of this study allows to examine relative changes 
rather than absolute levels of material condition, studying the latter as the result of 
social trajectories, realized (crisis exposure) and anticipated (expected mobility).  
 
Data 
The hypotheses are tested using data of Life in Transition Survey II (LiTS II). LiTS II, 
conducted jointly by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the 
World Bank in late 2010, surveyed almost 39.000 households in 34 countries to assess 
public attitudes, well-being and the impacts of economic and political change. As 
reported in the LiTS II report (EBRD 2011), one of the main reasons to conduct the 
survey was to see how attitudes, beliefs and values had been affected by the crisis. In 
particular, the survey provides vivid evidence of precisely how lives are objectively 
affected by the global economic crisis and its aftermath; additionally, many subjective 































































questions about attitudes and values have been asked. For this combination of data, 
besides using data collection methods and systems of measurement known and 
acceptable¹, the LiTS II represents a both valid and reliable dataset for the research 
questions that the current study seeks to address. 
The countries surveyed in LiTS II were mainly the “transition” countries in the former 
communist East: the Baltic states, Central and South-eastern Europe, and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. Additionally, for the first time, the coverage also 
included five Western European countries with advanced market economies: France, 
Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK. The joint sample (N = 5.504) of these five 
countries is selected for analysis for two main reasons. Firstly, as previously reported, 
the empirical model of this study assumes particular suitability in the context of affluent 
European countries because they have experienced high levels of economic growth and 
increasing prosperity before the recent economic recession, with high expectations 
internalized by people about their economic future. Secondly, the choice to focus on 
Western European countries also guarantees a sample composed of a relatively 
homogeneous group of countries, distinguishable from the other ones surveyed in 
reference to both the similar initial impact of the economic crisis and the level of 
democratic and civic maturity. As a consequence, also considering the results of the 
literature review, it is expected that research hypotheses are significant in the five 
Western European countries surveyed, going beyond a country-specific context. 

































































Following Inglehart and Welzel (2005), this study uses two main approaches to define 
and measure the components of the civic culture: the communitarian approach (or social 
capital approach) and the human development approach (or emancipative approach). 
Both such approaches follow the tradition of civic culture school, emphasizing that a 
broader set of civic attitudes and values are important in strengthening democracy. The 
first one emphasizes citizens’ loyalty to the rules of good conduct and generalized trust 
as fundamental orientations that support civic culture in a democracy, the second one 
emphasizes self-expression and emancipative values based on civil liberty and tolerance 
as central for society’s democratic quality.  
Communitarian approach. Following the communitarian approach, the anticivic impact 
of economic crisis may be evaluated by its influence on two attitudes: antinormative 
tendency and generalized distrust. The first one aims to measure the removal by the 
attitudes toward the role of the citizen in the public system, as a shared set of social 
norms (Almond and Verba, 1963); it may be operationally defined as a tendency to 
accept the legitimacy of some antinormative behaviours. Specifically, a battery of seven 
items is used (e.g., ‘Making an exaggerated insurance claim’, ‘Paying cash with no 
receipts to avoid paying VAT or other taxes’), preceded by the following sentence: 
‘Some people think that certain behaviours are always wrong, whereas other believe 































































that there are occasions when breaking the rules may be justified. How wrong, if at all, 
do you consider the following behaviours to be?’ (‘not wrong at all’ = 0, to ‘seriously 
wrong’ = 4). The composite index is operationalized as the count of ‘not wrong at all’ or 
‘a bit wrong’ responses. 
Generalized distrust is the attitude indicator more reliable to measure the absence of 
social capital at the micro-level, and it is widely accepted in the literature as a barometer 
of the health of democracy (Putnam et al., 1993; Putnam, 2000). In order to measure 
generalized distrust, respondents are asked about their level of trust toward people in 
general: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ (1 = complete distrust, 5 = complete trust).  
Human development approach. Compared to communitarian approach, the human 
development one does stress the civic importance of postmaterialist and emancipative 
values centred on human choice, emphasizing civic culture in terms of respect toward 
other people and their rights (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Consequently, the effects of 
crisis exposure are evaluated using two further indexes: intolerance and ethnic hostility. 
Intolerance index gauges the degree of prejudice that respondents have for individuals 
that are different from him/herself. Respondents are asked to mark those groups of 
people that they would dislike having as neighbours (mention = 1, otherwise = 0). The 
groups to choose from are 16 (e.g. homosexuals, drug-addicts, poor people, people of a 































































different religion, etc.) and the final index is operazionalized as the sum of selected 
groups. 
Ethnic hostility is constructed based on three items regarding respondents’ views about 
the presence of other ethnic groups: ‘People from other ethnic groups are enriching the 
cultural life of our country’, ‘The presence of people from other ethnic groups is a cause 
of insecurity’, ‘The presence of people from other ethnic groups increases 
unemployment’ (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Confirmatory factor analysis 
shows that the three indicators adequately capture one single factor. The final index is 
the mean of the three items, where higher scores reflect maximum ethnic hostility. 
 
Independent variable 
Crisis exposure. The crisis exposure is assessed by using the responses to the following 
question, present in the section of the LiTS questionnaire entitled “Impact of the crisis”: 
‘In the past two years, have you or anyone else in your household had to take any of the 
following measures as the result of a decline in income or other economic difficulty?’. 
This is followed by a battery of 19 behaviours (e.g., ‘Reduced consumption of staple 
foods’, ‘Stopped buying regular medications’, ‘Reduced vacations’) in which 
exploratory factor analysis shows the presence of several factors (e. g., payment default, 
reduced consumption of basic goods and services, etc.). However, the goal is not to 
assess the role played by different types of hardship, but to quantify the extent of the 































































material lifestyle change because of limited economic resources. Consequently, also 
considering that the final reliability index does not vary even when the less-correlated 
items are omitted, all the listed items are included. The composite index is 
operationalized as frequency of carried-out behaviours, measuring not a static material 





Expected mobility. In order to measure the expected mobility, as potential moderator 
and resource to avoid negative civic effects of crisis exposure, it is used a composite 
index. People are subjectively mobile if they perceive their own future place in society 
as higher or lower than the current one.  
Two self-placement questions are used to construct a composite index. The first 
question asks the respondents to assess their current socioeconomic position with 
respect to the people in their country: ‘Please imagine a ten-step ladder where on the 
bottom, the first step, stand the poorest 10% people in our country, and on the highest 
step, the tenth, stand the richest 10% of people in our country. On which step of the ten 
is your household today?’. The second question measures their expectation about future 
position: ‘And where on the ladder do you believe your household will be 4 years from 
now?’. The difference between the second answer and the first one does reflect the 































































balance of expected mobility in the near future (a positive score means a more 
ascendant mobility, a negative score means a more descendant mobility).  
 
Control variables 
Models are assessed using linear regression analyses and controlling for potentially 
confounding variables: gender, age, educational level and occupational status and 
country. Gender is a dummy variable with the value 0 for women and 1 for men. 
Participants are categorized by age into three groups: young adults (ages 18-34 years), 
middle-aged adults (ages 35-54 years) and older adults (aged older 54). The educational 
level is dichotomized into lower (lower secondary education or less) and higher (upper 
secondary education or more). Occupational status is recoded into three categories: 
employed, unemployed, other (not working category that includes students, 
homemakers and retired persons).  
 
The empirical model 
The empirical model is summarized in Figure 1. First, the general hypothesis (Hp1) 
states that life conditions worsening (level of crisis exposure) may increase anticivic 
attitudes: antinormative tendency, intolerance, social distrust, ethnic hostility. These 
effects are tested by controlling some sociodemographic and social status characteristics 
potentially related to the level of crisis exposure: sex, age, educational level and 































































occupational status. Additionally, to control for variation across countries, standard 
errors of the models have been clusterized by country, becoming robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation³. 
Second, it is hypothesized that expected mobility may play a compensatory role in 
moderating the effects of crisis exposure on civic attitudes (Hp2). Following Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) model of moderation, in a second step civic attitude is regressed on 
crisis exposure (the predictor) and expected mobility (the moderator), followed by their 
interaction term (crisis exposure by expected mobility). A moderator effect is present if 
the interaction between moderator variable and predictor variable is significant while 
the independent effect of each is statistically controlled (Baron and Kenny, 1986). To 
test such a moderation prediction and to validate the model’s reliability, the same 
regression analyses are performed on each of four civic attitudes.  
 




The communitarian theorists emphasize social trust and citizens’ loyalty to the rules of 
good conduct as the fundamental attitudes that sustain the civic culture in a democracy 
(Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). As indicated in the methods section, for this purpose two 































































indexes are calculated: antinormative tendency and social distrust. Table 1 presents the 
results of the linear regression models. In support of the hypothesis (Hp1), results 
indicate an effect of crisis exposure such that more crisis exposure is associated with 
lower civism. As shows table 1, controlling the sociodemographic and social status 
characteristics, crisis exposure is significant in each one of the two models 1 (β = .039 
and p < .05 for antinormative tendency, β = .129 and p < .001 for generalized distrust). 
In particular, increases in crisis exposure are associated with increases in antinormative 
tendency and generalized distrust.  
 
-- TABLE 1 AROUND HERE -- 
 
Most importantly, it is hypothesized that expected mobility would moderate the impact 
of crisis exposure on civic attitudes. For this reason, the crisis exposure by expected 
mobility interaction for each attitude are introduced in models 2 (also including the 
main effect of expected mobility). Table 1 shows that the interaction effect is significant 
only on generalized distrust (β = -.070 and p < .001) but not on antinormative tendency 
(p > .05). For generalized trust, the addition of the interaction term to the model yields a 
significant contribution to the regression equation (p < .05). This finding indicates that 
expected mobility is a moderator of the crisis-distrust relationship. The direction of the 































































regression coefficient for the interaction term is negative and shows that, as expected 
mobility increases, the strength of the crisis-distrust relation significantly weakens.  
As regards the communitarian approach, these findings are in line with the expectations, 
which means that hypotheses Hp1 (for both attitudes) and Hp2 (only for generalized 
distrust) are not rejected. 
 
Human development approach 
Following the human development approach, emphasizing post-materialist and 
emancipative values centred on human choice, the impact of the crisis in civic culture is 
measured in terms of lack of respect toward other people, through two additional 
indexes: social intolerance and ethnic hostility.  
To analyse the consequences of crisis exposure and the moderating effect of expected 
mobility, reference may be made to table 2 showing the same multivariate test presented 
in table 1. In the two models 1, the analysis presents results that are similar to those 
shown earlier, using the communitarian indexes: both human development indexes are 
positively related to crisis exposure. In particular, controlling the sociodemographic and 
social status characteristics, increases in crisis exposure are found to be associated with 
increases in intolerance and ethnic hostility (β = .090 and p < .001 for intolerance, β 
= .085 and p < .001 for ethnic hostility). 
 































































-- TABLE 2 AROUND HERE – 
 
In both models 2, the crisis exposure by expected mobility interaction term is 
statistically significant (β = -.030 and p < .001 for intolerance, β = -.027 and p < .05 for 
ethnic hostility). Also in this case, the negative valence of the interaction coefficient 
shows that, as upward mobility increases, the strength of the crisis effect on attitudes 
weakens.  
In summary, crisis exposure does have a direct effect on each of the four civic attitudes, 
controlling for sociodemographic variables. Additionally, on three of four analysed 
attitudes, the crisis-mobility interaction term is statistically significant. To better 
interpret the interaction effect, a categorical index is used to distinguish respondents 
into three mobility groups: no mobility (a future positioning identical to the present 
one), ascendant mobility (a future positioning higher than the present one) and 
descendant mobility (a future positioning lower than the present one). In figure 2 are 
plotted the predicted margins of civic attitude by crisis exposure and type of mobility, 
while controlling for sociodemographic and social status variables. As the figure shows, 
crisis exposure is more predictive of anticivic attitudes to the extent that expected 
mobility is descendant. The effect of the social downgrading does appear to be present 
on each of four civic attitudes (even though it is not significant, like on antinormative 
tendency), and it is significantly higher on generalized distrust and intolerance. As the 































































citizens evaluate future mobility as worsening, their civic attitudes significantly 
decrease in relation to the crisis exposure level. In other words, people exposed to the 
crisis develop anticivic attitudes of social hostility toward other people, mostly when the 
perspective of social downgrading is also present. At the same time, when citizens 
prospectively evaluate their future mobility as ascendant, their civic attitudes tend to be 
independent of crisis exposure level. Consequently, this result is consistent with the idea 
that the prospective of upward mobility does play a compensatory role in attenuating the 
effects of crisis exposure on anticivism. On the contrary, the perspective of social 
immobility does not have a clear moderating role, tending to be more similar to 
descendant mobility on communitarian attitudes, and more similar to ascendant mobility 
on human development attitudes.  
 
-- FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE -- 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Previous research on attitudinal consequences of macroeconomic events, as economic 
crises, has been concerned predominantly with political attitudes, and little research has 
investigated the civic attitudes. Additionally, to date, no prior work has investigated 
variables moderating the impact of the economic crises on civic attitudes. The present 































































study attempted to address this gap of knowledge by focusing on civic attitudes, and by 
investigating expected relative mobility as a potential moderating variable.  
Firstly, in line with the previous empirical evidence stressing the presence of democratic 
risks in times of crisis (e.g., Bermeo, 2003; Turner and Carballo, 2005; Remmer, 1991), 
the results of this study shows that the recent economic crisis is able to provoke a 
‘crisis’ of civism in the European countries surveyed. These effects are relatively strong 
for both approaches of civic culture, the communitarian approach and the human 
development one. Specifically, consistent effects are observed in all civic attitudes 
evaluated: increases in crisis exposure are found be associated with increases in 
antinormative tendency, social distrust, intolerance and ethnic hostility.  
Consistently with previous literature, the rationale for this result is that the material 
worsening generated by crisis may increase the sense of frustration and dissatisfaction, 
producing also a disruption in social norms that are central to social cohesion. In 
particular, a material shock may have destructive effects on social integration when 
feelings of fear are diffuse, and future risks and costs related to the shock are not 
perceived as equally distributed. In relation to this point, a significant level of crisis 
exposure may not be enough in order to trigger anticivic consequences, if it is not also 
accompanied by a competitive social pressure mechanism. 
Secondly, following this view, it was expected that future mobility would moderate the 
impact of the crisis on civic attitudes. The analyses provide clear, albeit preliminary, 































































support for the moderation hypothesis, showing that expected relative mobility 
influences the strength of the crisis-civism relationship. These results then confirm that 
expected mobility may become a key factor in times of crisis (Ragnarsdòttir et al., 
2013): when actual material conditions become worse than in the past, future 
perspective plays a role even more significant on perception of well-being and 
satisfaction. 
The impact of the crisis appears to be particularly high for people with downward 
mobility, with the coefficient associated with civic attitudes always statistically 
significant. This indicates that a civic ‘recession’ may also occur among those who do 
not belong to civically marginal groups, in the event that they are uncertain and afraid of 
their future social position. By contrast, such impact is not significant in people that 
expect upward mobility. The perspective of upward mobility works as a protective 
barrier from the fraying of social fabric generated by the economic crisis, strengthening 
the social ties of people and their loyalty to the community (Scalon and Cano, 2008).  
In other words, when hit by the crisis, people will turn against the social coexistence 
norms (e.g., tolerance, social trust) in place all the more if they cumulatively perceive 
also their future position to be downward mobile. On the contrary, people would be 
willing to accept a significant fall in living standards if they could move up compared 
with other people (see Layard, 2005). As a consequence, it is not only important what 
you get today than yesterday, but also where you think you might end up tomorrow 































































compared to others. Even a large drop in the standard of living may not trigger much 
‘social anger’ and sense of unfairness if individuals think that the crisis in perspective 
harms them less than most others.  
Beyond individual differences due to personality traits (pessimism, fear, etc.), evidence 
relating to expected mobility suggests that the impact of the crisis on civism may be 
context specific. When the economy stagnates and material goods become scarcer, the 
perception that those goods are locked in a zero-sum game becomes more intense, 
leading to intensify levels of social competition, as if to say: ‘Mors tua, vita mea’. 
Future perspective may then depend on the duration and severity of the economic 
recession, and consequently by the type of austerity measures or by significant social 
protection schemes introduced by the government. The findings may provide a clue as 
to why economic crises sometimes have only weak civic effects, thus also allowing to 
draw policy implications from such research. Firstly, a policy which raises the income 
of the population in relatively smaller extent, but continuously and providing new 
opportunities for individuals, may induce higher expectations of mobility. At the 
contrary, a large but single raising in income, without future prospects of further 
increase, generates more increase in uncertainty than a smaller but permanent income 
raising, with prospects confirming future improvements. Secondly, the results of this 
study show that crisis exposure is civically dangerous when also accompanied by a 
competitive social pressure mechanism; as a consequence, a policy able to constantly 































































decrease the level of socioeconomic inequality, increasing the public perception of 
social justice, may limit risks of deterioration of civil fabric in hard times. Thirdly, the 
level of expected upward mobility might also be a correlate of trust in political 
institutions and in the country system in general. In countries where the confidence of 
the citizens in the institutional capacity to resolve the crisis is lower, the hope in the 
future is less widely present and many people reckon that they cannot expect further 
improvements. Consequently, a civic ‘recession’ may be limited not only by specific 
economic and social measures, but also by the wide diffusion of specific political 
attitudes, as political trust. 
However, the current study has some limitations that need acknowledgment. Firstly, by 
performing empirical analysis using four different civic attitudes, this study provides a 
robust assessment of the relationship between crisis exposure and civic attitudes. 
Although the replication of our findings across a range of different civic attitudes is a 
strength of this research, a complete replication of this study with more multi-item 
scales would be desirable. 
Additionally, as shown in this research, to evaluate socio-economic status in terms of 
social trajectory, instead than statically, may be crucial to understand a potential civic 
‘recession’. However, in this study the material change generated by the crisis is 
measured not by using longitudinal data but retrospective questions. Future research 































































should establish the generality of the results reported in the current investigation by 
conducting within-participants studies.  
Further, these empirical findings may initiate a careful reassessment of people’s 
motivation to be civically engaged in economically more prosperous contexts in the 
future research on determinants of civic attitudes. The large sample of this study, 
including all the European countries surveyed in the LiTS II dataset, provides a robust 
and extensive evidence base in relation to the recent economic crisis, moving beyond 
single-country studies. However, it remains to be confirmed whether this empirical 
evidence is a distinctive feature of Europe - and of countries that already have high 
incomes and established democracies - or whether the relationship between economic 
crisis and civism is a general empirical fact also in economically less developed and 
politically less stable countries. At the same time, it may be further interesting to 
distinguish European countries in relation to the future prospects of economic growth, 
in order to investigate whether the civic impact of the recent economic crisis is more 
significant in Southern than Northern countries, eliciting a sort of ‘civic divide’. The 
absence of country cases as Spain and mainly Greece (the European country most 
affected by the economic crisis) represents an important further limitation of this study, 
which should be addressed by future research. 
 
 





































































































































 Supplementary methodological information and complete 
dataset are freely available at the EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development) website: http://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/economic-research-and-
data/data/lits.html  
² Each behaviour may have a specific subjective value and may be perceived as more or 
less depriving than other behaviours; however, this information (the perceived 
importance) is not asked in the questionnaire. 
³ When the number of country cases is large, the use of mixed models or multilevel 
modelling is an effective way to assess contextual variation and how it decreases as 
country variables are added. With only five countries, however, such models do not 
provide reliable estimates. As a result, the analyses are based on a series of fixed-effects 
generalized linear models. For each dependent variable models that include a set of 
country dummy regressors representing the country variable are fitted. Preliminary 
models were also fitted, specifying interactions between country and various 
explanatory variables. None of the interaction effects were substantively large, however, 
so they were removed from the reported models in order to simplify interpretation.  
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Table 1. Communitarian approach: effects of crisis exposure on civic attitudes (model 
1) and moderating role of expected mobility (model 2): parameter estimates and level of 
significance of the stepwise regression analysis. 




 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 1.26*** 1.27*** 4.27*** 4.06*** 
Gender (ref: Male) -.132* -.107 .215** .229** 















Educational level .182** .211** .758*** .743*** 















Crisis exposure .039* .055 .129*** .445*** 
Upward mobility  .001  .044 






N 4287 4028 4254 3998 
Note: the sample includes all the five EU countries surveyed: France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, UK (LiTS 
II, 2010). Standard errors have been clusterized by country and are robust to heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. 










































































Table 2. Human development approach: effects of crisis exposure on civic attitudes 
(model 1) and moderating role of expected mobility (model 2): parameter estimates and 
level of significance of the stepwise regression analysis. 
 Human development approach 
 Intolerance Ethnic hostility 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 2.28*** 2.10*** 4.62*** 5.15*** 
Gender (ref: Male) .103* .111* .232*** .205** 















Educational level .329*** .338*** .905*** .909*** 















Crisis exposure .090*** .222*** .085*** .188** 
Upward mobility  .031  -.097 






N 4287 4028 4147 3909 
Note: the sample includes all the five EU countries surveyed: France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, UK (LiTS 
II, 2010). Standard errors have been clusterized by country and are robust to heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. 












































































































































































HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 
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